The reverted commit 968ce9af598024ec71e9ffb2d15c3997a13ad754
is suspected (through the use of bisection) of causing network slowdowns.
Revert for now as we are close to release.
Centralize HUD updating in update_builtin_statbars.
Fixes race condition in 'on joinplayer' that causes stat bar bugs.
Correctly scales stat bars to custom max values set by mods.
Store the rotation in the node as a 4x4 transformation matrix internally (through IDummyTransformationSceneNode), which allows more manipulations without losing precision or having gimbal lock issues.
Network rotation is still transmitted as Eulers, though, not as matrix. But it will stay this way in 5.0.
Previously, when using 'place on vmanip' to add a schematic to a
lua voxelmanip, if part of the schematic was outside the voxelmanip
volume, the outside part would often appear in a strange place
elsewhere inside the voxelmanip instead of being trimmed off.
This was due to the out-of-bounds check checking the index.
A position outside the voxelmanip can have an index that satisfies
'0 <= index <= voxelmanip volume', causing the node to be placed
at a strange position inside the voxelmanip.
Use 'vm->m_area.contains(pos)' instead.
Move index calculation to later in the code to optimise.
If a formspec is submitted from a form fields handling
callback of another form (or "formspec shown from another
formspec"), the fields submitted for it can get
rejected by the form exploit mitigation subsystem with a
message like "'zorman2000' submitted formspec
('formspec_error:form2') but server hasn't sent formspec to
client, possible exploitation attempt" being sent to logs.
This was already reported as #7374 and a change was made
that fixed the simple testcase included with that bug
report but the bug still kept lurking around and popping
out in more complicated scenarios like the advtrains TSS
route programming UI.
Deep investigation of the problem revealed that this
sequence of events is entirely possible and leads to the
bug:
1. Server: show form1
2. Client *shows form1*
3. Client: submits form1
4. Server: show form2
5. Client: says form1 closed
6. Client *shows form2*
7. Client: submits form2
What happens inside the code is that when the server in
step 4 sends form2, the registry of opened forms is
updated to reflect the fact that form2 is now the valid
form for the client to submit. Then when in step 5 client
says "form1 was closed", the exploit mitigation subsystem
code deletes the registry entry for the client without
bothering to check whether the form client says was
closed just now is indeed the form that is recorded in
that entry as the valid form. Then later, in step 7 the
client tries to submit its valid form fields, these will
be rejected because the entry is missing.
It turns out the procedure where the broken code resides
already gets the form name so a simple "if" around the
offending piece of code fixes the whole thing. And
advtrains TSS agrees with that.
